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PRESIDENT MITTERRAND AND THE FRENCH
POLITICAL SYSTEM

Alistair Cole
University of Keele
The relevance of biography to the study of politics has often been
called into question. Many political scientists have rejected
biography outright as a pursuit more suited to psychologists,
impressionistic journalists, and political historians . They have
preferred the "scientific" study of political systems, within which
there is little place for the individual leader. I would argue that an
appreciation of the contribution of individual political leaders can
be an essential component of any full understanding of a given
polity, although this should not imply uncritical acceptance of a
"great man" theory of political and historical development. Even
if we accept, however, that individuals can leave their indelible
imprint, it is unclear whether political biography, at least as
practiced by certain of its exponents, is particularly well suited to
measuring the contribution of individual leaders to a society's
political development.
The central justification of biography stricro sensu, "that
knowledge of the subject explains or illuminates his or her
achievements," is far from axiomatic. 1 Several potential pitfalls
await the biographer. First, there is the danger of over-identification with the subject, such that actions are judged disproponionately in the light of what the individual concerned assens to
explain his or her behavior. This is especially valid when a
politician's memoirs are trusted as an objective statement of his or
her beliefs or ideas or actions. Second, there is a tendency in
cenain quarters for an over-concentration on incidental personal
detail. Much of what biographies seek to illuminate, in particular
the psychological predispositions of their subjects, might actually
be irrelevant to an assessment of the contribution to politics made
by an individual. Unwarranted extrapolations may be made from
early childhood experiences with little firm evidence to support
the biographer's conclusions. Third, there is always the risk that
individuals will be treated in isolation, extracted from the political
or historical circumstances within which they operate.
These are, of course, oft-levelled criticisms which themselves caricature the biographical method. It is clear that a variety
of different approaches can be subsumed under the title of political biography. There is no commonly agreed conceptual frame-
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work. Attention has been concentrated upon a number of related
lines of inquiry .
PROBLEMS WITH PSYCHOBIOGRAPHY
At its best psychobiography can give interesting insights into the
personal~ty traits of political lea~e:s, the reaso~s unde1:lying the~r
political rn~olvement, and the driving for~e ~~1ch motivates their
pursuit of high ot:fice. _To~heextent ~hat 1~d1v1du~lsmatter, such
analysis can be 11lumrnatrng, especially rn relation to whether
many political leaders possess the requisite qualities and skills
normally associated with leadership. 2 At its worst, however, such
biography can be totally misleading, partly because it makes
unwarranted extrapolations relating to an individual ' s political
behavior from aspects of his or her private life, but also because
it can misrepresent the latter. Formative experiences are subjectively selected, and automatic associations are established . This
is not to deny that personal beliefs and traits of character inherited
from an individual's past upbringing might be of considerable
importance in explaining subsequent behavior patterns and political beliefs. Margaret Thatcher , the grocer's daughter who became
UK Prime Minister, frequently referred to the fact. To refute this
en bloc would be excessive. But an early note of caution is
advisable. As Robert Skidelsky notes sardonically, the problem
with such an approach is that "every achievement is actually
something else displaced and it is this something else which ought
to be the focus of biography." 3 Finally, there is the insuperable
problem of measurement. How do we measure the importance of
psychological factors, especially when so much of the evidence is
so ambiguous, and provided by the interested politicians themselves?
POLITICIANS AS REPRESENTATIVES OF AN AGE
A somewhat different approach justifies political biography not
primarily by focusing on an individual's psychological make-up,
but by treating politicians as representatives of a particular age or
generation. The effort undertaken is not so much one of socialized
psychology, as one of assessing the attributes of political leadership favored by a given historical situation. The individual
political leader is of interest not primarily as a result of any
dynamic personal qualities, but because he or she is able to
articulate and aggregate the demands of at least one important
element of society at a particular historical period. Such biogra phy then addresses itself not just to the individual politician, but
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also to the broader political environment. A related line of
analysis concentrates on individuals as representatives of a generation. Thus in France biographies of the various student leaders
of May '68 have proliferated. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the unofficial
leader of the events, is credited with being the perfect embodiment
of the "May '68 generation." At its best such biography can
indicate the manner in which different generations perceive
political reality.
THE GREAT MAN
The "great man" approach supports the view that "historical
events are caused by, or bear the imprint of, or would have been
very different but for, the unique personalities of leading actors. 4
Set against this model is one which asserts that the key to
understanding historical and political change lies in analyzing a
combination of social movements, socio-economic forces, institutional constraints, etc. In my opinion, the "truth" probably lies
somewhere in between the two models. It is not necessary to
accept a reductionist" great man" approach to political and historical development in order to appreciate the importance that political leaders can sometimes assume. Individuals exploit opportunities created by a particular set of circumstances, make choices
from a number of different available options, exercise personal
political skill. Some would argue that they occasionally exercise
a charismatic authority, although it is not the purpose of this article
to consider that area of study. But their achievements must be set
in the context of the precise socio-economic, political, and cultural circumstances within which they function as political agents.
The study of political leadership clearly involves far more
than biography, which nonetheless has a useful contribution to
make. It demands consideration not merely of personality, but
also of structural incentives and political methods for the realization of personal ambitions. Personalities never function in isolation. This article concentrates upon the career of one of France's
undisputed "great men" of the post-war period, Fran<;ois Mitterrand. In particular, I shall concentrate on the manner in which he
succeeded in manipulating the presidential institutions of the Fifth
Republic to build his political career. I hope thereby to combine
a study of leadership with an appreciation of a changing political
environment, and to provide an assessment of how Mitterrand's
ideas, style of leadership, and ways of acting within the political
system have evolved since becoming president in 1981.
France has had more than its fair share of "great men," so
much so that, prior to the Fifth Republic, a fear of strong leaders
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became an essential part of the French republican tradition. 5 At
first sight it appeared as though by choosing Charles de Gaulle in
May-June 1958 the French nation had reverted from a democraticrepublican model to a more authoritarian one, by bringing back
the "great man" as they had done on several occasions in the past.
In fact, such fears were greatly exaggerated. It is not proposed to
consider the contribution made by General de Gaulle to the
political developme~t of the F~fth Republic, although such ~n
analysis would provide proof, if any were needed, that certain
individuals leave their own unmistakable imprint upon their
politic~ en_vir':mment. I m_ustpoint o~t, however, that the presidential rnst1tut1onsof the Fifth Republic bequeathed by de Gaulle
have institutionalized highly personal political leadership for the
first time in post-revolutionary republican history. The direct
election of the French president, introduced by constitutional
referendum in October 1962, has greatly promoted the importance of personal political appeal, at the expense of more collective forms of expression such as political parties. One of the
central themes of this article is that this has benefited nobody more
than Mitterrand.
Mitterrand was elected president in 1981, an event which
surprised many commentators. I shall consider, firstly, changes
in Mitterrand's attitude towards the institutions of the Fifth
Republic, if there were any, once he had been elected president;
secondly, the ideas which he sought to put into operation; and,
finally, his individual governing style.
MITTERRAND AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF ST A TE
Despite his oft-repeated opposition to the monarchical character
of the Fifth Republic's institutions, Mitterrand's 1981 presidential platform, the 110 Propositions, arguably contained no constitutional proposals directly aimed at challenging the supremacy of
the French president. As a candidate, Mitterrand promised to
reduce the presidential mandate from seven to five years, and he
paid vague respect to the idea of reinforcing the powers of the
National Assembly, but these proposals were not implemented.
Once elected president, Mitterrand substantially accepted the
"executive presidency," which had evolved since de Gaulle and
against which he had so violently railed since the late 1950s.
Immediately upon his presidential victory of May 10, 1981, he
dissolved the conservative-dominated National Assembly elected
in 1978, and called upon the electorate to "give him the means to
govern" by electing a Socialist majority. The dual mechanism of
dissolution and of presidential involvement in elections for the
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National Assembly was cleverly exploited by the new "executive
president," as it had been by de Gaulle.
The crushing majority for the Socialist Party that was
returned in June 1981 owed its existence to Mitterrand. Once this
majority had been elected, he insisted that the 110 Propositions
were to act as "the charter for the government's activities," and
that Socialist deputies must not overstep the limits of this program. The pattern of presidential supremacy was thus reasserted
by Mitterrand's early actions.
Although Mitterrand introduced no successful reforms to
limit the powers of the president during the first five years of his
presidency, he claimed to have modified the constitutional practice of the Fifth Republic and to have restored control of government. In September 1987 he explained:
Working in collaboration with Pierre Mauroy
and then Laurent Fabius, I attempted to fullfil
my duties in such a way as the president
presides, the government governs, and parliament legislates. I have protected the major
functions performed by the president, in particular the concentration on great national issues, which stem from the constitution and
especially from article 5.6
As ever it is difficult to accept Mitterrand's assessment at face
value, as the essential elements of presidential authority remained
intact until March 1986. Nonetheless certain commentators did
discern a move away from the all-powerful presidency under
Mitterrand, firstly during the early period of Mauroy's premiership, and then much more apparently under Fabius, who replaced
Mauroy as prime minister in July 1984. Mitterrand undoubtedly
left Fabius a greater degree of maneuver than Mauroy. This was
probably an attempt to prepare the ground rules for the virtual
certainty of cohabitation after March 1986. But few doubted that
when conflicts arose between prime minister and president, the
latter retained his ascendency. We are left with the impression of
Mitterrand as a politician who, in an ideal world, would reinvent
the presidency, but who, in the highly presidentialized regime of
the Fifth Republic, was content, initially at least, to accept the
regime as he found it.7
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THE ENIGMA OF PRESIDENT MITfERRAND
Discussion of the policies enacted by the political left in France
lies well beyond the limited scope of this article. I shall limit my
attention to how observers perceived Mitterrand to have changed
over the seven-year period in office. In a highly provocative
biography of Mitten:and's first seven_-year peri?d at the E~ysee,
Catherine Ney has discerned seven different Mitterrand's rn her
book Les sept Mitterrand. While Ney's historical allusions seem
to me somewhat far-fetched, it is perhaps useful to retain four of
her seven comparisons in order illustrate Mitterrand's essential
political flexibility.
FRAN~OIS-LEON BLUM (MAY 1981-JUNE 1982)
Carried to power on a wave of left-wing enthusiasm in May 1981,
which naturally led to comparisons with the Popular Front government of 1936, Mitterrand supported a radical program of social
and economic change presided over by Maurey, his first prime
minister. The government was led by the Socialists but included
Communist ministers, the first time this had happened since 1947.
During the "state of grace" (May 1981-June 1982), the reforms
carried out by the left stemmed directly from Mitterrand's 110
Propositions. It was a classic left-wing program: large swathes of
French industry were nationalized, new powers were decentralized to the regions and local government, labour relations were
reformed, and important redistributive social and fiscal reforms
were enacted. On an economic level, the left relied upon Keynesian reflationary policies based on increased popular consumption as the key to growth and to fighting unemployment, which
was declared to be the government's number one priority.
The comparison with Blum stems from the frenzied character of Socialist reforms during this first period. Mitterrand
shared the belief-previously imposed on Blum in 1936-that
after such a long absence from power, it would have been
politically impossible for the left not to have gone ahead with an
ambitious social and economic program of reforms. Mitterrand's
primary objective was thus political, as well as strategic. His
strategy was to tie the Communists into the governmental alliance
in order to prevent them from making mischief outside of it, and
to consolidate control over ex-Communist voters attracted to him
in the 1981 election.
But there is little reason to doubt Mitterrand's personal
c_ommitmentto the model of change outlined in the 110Propositions. However we interpret his ideas, and however much we
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recognize that strategic considerations have always held the upper
hand over ideological ones, we are forced to recognize that once
elected president in 1981, Mitterrand was extremely conscious of
the fact that he symbolized the hopes of the peupfe de gauche. It
is interesting in this respect that Mitterrand was initially reluctant
to accept the need for a "pause" in the reform program, as
demanded by his finance minister Jacques Delors, or the introduction of a tighter, anti-inflationary economic policy, as urged with
increasing insistence by both Delors and Mauroy.
"FRAN~OIS-CAMILLE CHA UTEMPS" (JUNE 1982-MARCH
1983)
The left's economic U-turn took place in two stages: in June 1982
and in March 1983, despite Mitterrand's early reservations. The
allusion to Chautemps, the Radical prime minister who replace d
Blum in 1937, is meant to signify Mitterrand's acceptance that the
dream of a break with capitalism was dead, but that it was
important not to admit it, for fear of alienating the left-wing
electorate. In June 1982, Mitterrand succumbed to the pressure
exerted by Mauroy and Delors and agreed to a deflationary
economic package which attempted to ease the pressure on public
spending and inflation. At this stage, neither Mitterrand nor his
prime minister Mauroy was willing to admit publicly that the left
had changed course. The crucial point in Mitterrand's first
septennat was reached in March 1983, when the president was
called upon to arbitrate between two opposing economic policies
in a move which set the course for the rest of his presidency. In
effect, Mitterrand agreed with those who argued that the government had to abandon its early attempt to reflate the French
economy and to adopt a tight monetary policy in order to control
inflation. 8
Mitterrand's interminable ten-day hesitation before settling on one of these rival options was indicative of his governing
style. It gave the impression that the new economic course did not
fully enjoy the president's confidence.
"FRAN~OIS-RONALD
1986)

REAGAN" (MARCH 1983-MARCH

According to Ney, having abandoned the left's messianic task of
legislating a break with capitalism, Mitterrand-with characteristic flexibility-gradually became the apostle of economic liberalism, imported from Reagan's America and Thatcher's Britain .
Ney points to Mitterrand's personal crusade for lower taxes in
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1984 to his belief that artificial financial aid for lameduck
indu;tries should cease, to the new presidential discourse endorsing profit and succes~, and to a belief i~ the superi_or efficiency ?f
the private sector, rn order to provide the evidence for this
•
9
companson .
Whatever the merits of ey's comparison with Reagan,
there was clearly a qualitative change in governmental policy and
presidential discourse in the latter part of th_e first_ ~ocialist
administration. For as long as Mauroy was pnme mrnISter the
public had the impression that Blum-style reformist socialism
remained on the agenda , symbolized dramatically in 1983-4 by
the church schools crisis. In July 1984 the old-style Socialist
Maurey was replace by Fabius, at thirty-seven the youngest prime
minister this century, a man carefully nurtured by Mitterrand
since the early 1970s. Analysis of Fabius's program between
1984 and 1986 lies outside the present study, but we should note
that the ideology underpinning the Fabius administration was that
of modernization, which for many was a euphemism for the left
abandoning its left-oriented program of 1981-2.
Mitterrand's public speeches from late 1983 onwards
suggest that this transformation of old-style Socialism was consciously willed. For instance it was Mitterrand who backed his
then industry minister Fabius in February 1984 against Mauroy,
his prime minister , in relation to the need for closures and job
losses in the steel industry. Once Fabius had become prime
minster, his full-scale modernization program arguably contrib uted to the slow death of old-style socialism in France. In a whole
range of policy areas the left' s traditional policies were quietly
called into question in the name of economic efficiency: nationalizations, economic planning, welfare policy, employment policy , attitude towards the private sector, industrial policy. During
this period Mitterrand was frequently to be heard justifying the
policy options of his ambitious young prime minister. The
disagreements that did occur between Mitterrand and Fabius were
over the latter's overarching ambition, caustically dampened by
Mitterrand, rather than over the content of government policy.
Taking the 1981-6 administration as a whole, we might
argue that Mitterrand undoubtedly performed a valuable service
for the French nation. Without the left's early radical program and
the difficulties it encountered, it is unclear whether there would
ever have been widespread recognition in France that the problems of economic management could not be explained solely in
terms of the deficiencies of the capitalist system, and that the left,
as _well as the right, had to be prepared to manage the economy.
Mitterrand himself had declared back in 1975 that "the economic
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crisis is capitalism itself, it was caused by capitalism and not
unleashed by the oil crisis of 1973." 10 Ten years later his tune had
changed .
On a personal level the five -year period in office taught
Mitterrand the absolute need to become well versed in economic
affairs. Before 1981 he had deliberately cultivated a haughty,
distrustful attitude towards economic issues. Mitterrand's reiteration of simplistic Marxist concepts to deal with complicated
economic problems reflected in part his failure to understand their
complexity. This willful economic ignorance cost him dearly in
his televized debate with Valery Giscard d'Estaing before the
second round of the 1974 presidential elections. Such was his
distrust of the economy that when elected president in 1981 he
relegated the finance ministry-traditionally
number two-to
sixteenth position in the ministerial hierarchy, a foolhardy act
quickly reversed. By 1986 Mitterrand could boast a solid grasp of
the complexities of the economy; some would argue that this
occurred only after a hard practical apprenticeship between 1981
and 1986.
"FRAN<;OIS-L 'ARBITRE "
In the legislative elections of March 1986 the Socialists, the
presidential party, were defeated at the hands of a right-wing
coalition. This inaugurated a constitutionally unprecedented
period of cohabitation between a Socialist president and a rightwing parliamentary majority in the National Assembly. At one
stroke the political basis for the executive presidency-the existence of a parliamentary majority to back the president-was
removed. Mitterrand immediately named Jacques Chirac, leader
of the victorious coalition, as prime minister, thereby respecting
the eminently democratic logic that control of the executive must
be entrusted to the winners of the latest election. From the outset,
Mitterrand positioned himself as President de tous LesFram;ais,
the arbiter president above the political fray. His primary objective in stressing his role as president of all the French was to
promote consensus across the left-right boundary in an attempt to
efface the electorate 's memory of the left's unpopularity from
1982 to 1986, and to promote a new image for himself as a wise,
just and kindly but firm president , a figure above the humdrum of
daily politics . From being the executive-president of 1981-6
Mitterrand now declared himself to be an arbiter, the constitutionaljustification for which lay in article 5 of the 1958 constitution.
He did not challenge the government's right to govern according
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to the constitution, but reserved his duty to fullfil his constitutional
duties in particular that of arbitrage.
' Far from being a disinterested, objective referee, Mitterrand initially envisaged his arbiter function as one of defending
the rights of minorities and the underprivileged in society . In May
1986 he declared :
It is my duty to act in those essential areas
which form part of the presidential domain, as
defined by the constitution . In addition, in
exercising my arbitral function, I must represent all those people who form part of a minority, and all those categories of people who are
liable to suffer from injustice . 11
This suggested that the new, benevolent father-figure president
had not forgotten his left-wing electors and would strive to protect
their interests against a confrontational Chirac. But it was not in
Mitterrand 's interests to transform cohabitation into a new leftright battle. To a large extent, Mitterrand's attempt to portray a
new ecumenical image as president of all the French could be
reduced to political maneuvering-an attempt to attract centerright voters alienated by Chirac into the forthcoming presidential
election. But it also reflected a mature personal conclusion,
reached after the left's years in power, that the left and right shared
the same viewpoint on many of the great problems facing France,
and that cohabitation had finally revealed this to be the case. This
conclusion lay behind Mitterrand's decision to name his old rival
Michel Rocard as prime minster in May 1988, and it explained his
attempts to extend the boundaries of his presidential majority
beyond the strict confines of the Socialist Party, once he had been
re-elected in May 1988.
"FRAN<;OIS-ROBERT SCHUMANN" (MAY 1988-MARCH
1990)
While it is clearly too early to draw a provisional balance sheet of
the first two years of Mitterrand's second seven-year term, we can
at least indicate certain key factors. In his 1988 campaign charter,
the Lettre a taus !es Fran9ais, Mitterrand proclaimed solemnly:
I believe and hope that whatever majorities
there are in future, we will return neither to an
"absolute" president, in effect an all-powerful
chief, as with the beginning of the Fifth Re-
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public, nor to a president who has no power at
all, a nonentity, as in the Fourth. 12
A survey ofthefirsttwentymonths or so since the April-May 1988
presidential elections suggests, superficially at least, that Mitterrand had respected his campaign promise to exercise a more
limited conception of presidential power than had existed prior to
cohabitation. He had concentrated largely on the traditional
presidential domain of foreign policy, defense and European
affairs, leaving Rocard's minority Socialist government in charge
of domestic policy . Manifest presidential interventionism in
areas "reserved" for the prime minister were less apparent under
Rocard than either Mauroy or Fabius. But this conclusion must be
qualified. Rocard had justified the major reforms passed during
his premiership--wealth tax, minimum wage, priority for education-by referring to Mitterrand's Lettre a taus les Franr;ais.
Presidential supremacy remained intact, despite Mitterrand's
weakening hold over the Socialists and a creeping sensation of
l' apres-mitterrandisme haunting the corridors of power.
Leaving mundane domestic policy issues to his government, Mitterrand has concentrated upon exploiting his position as
one of Europe's elder statesmen in order to hasten European
integration and the construction of a federal Europe. France's
presidency of the EC in the second half of 1989 was extremely
active in this respect. Mitterrand also drew considerable prestige
from the bicentenary celebrations of the French Revolution. For
three days (July 13-16, 1989) Paris was transformed into the
diplomatic capital of the world, when the bicentenary celebrations
were combined with the G7 meeting of the world's leading
nations.
By comparison with the first two years of Mauroy's
premiership (1981-3) French socialism would appearto have lost
its heroic aura. It has become, instead, a socialism of the possible,
as Mitterrand himself advocated in 1970. Left-wing critics of
Rocard's consensual brand of social democracy have criticized
the administration for lacking a "grand design," criticisms which
are ultimately addressed to Mitterrand . What the left has gained
in credibility, particularly in relation to its capacity for economic
management, it has perhaps lost in inspiration. It is easier to
inspire enthusiasm amongst grass roots supporters for visions of
an alternative society than it is for inflation statistics. Such is the
price, however, of political success, a success to which Mitterrand
has contributed more than anybody else .
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POLICY ADVISERS
In the words of Schifres and Sarazin:
Whatever the subject, however miniscule,
Mitterrand never confined himself to a single
source of information, even if it were fullest
and most knowledgeable. On the contrary, he
always compounded the briefings, the contacts, the conversations, and formed his opinion in that way. 13
The advantage of this method of patient reflection was that Mitterrand was always particularly well informed before talcing decisions,
and therefore unlikely to act on impulse. The
disadvantage was that the president often gave
the impression of uncertainty and hesitation,
fuelling suspicions of deep disagreements with
his prime minister or other ministers even
where none actually existed. On occasion, this
governing style had unfortunate consequences,
especially when Mitterrand was called upon to
settle major economic questions. His apparent
hesitations caused financial markets to panic.
In his excellent biography Les annees Mitterrand, Serge
July, editor of Liberation, recalls in considerable detail how,
leading up to the crucial economic tum-around of March 1983,
Mitterrand finally arrived at his decision to devalue the franc and
remain within the EMS. Ten days passed before the president
finally confirmed his decision, during which period even his
closest advisers claimed to have been kept in the dark, so much so
that contradictory statements were regularly issued to the media.
In fact the coalitions advocating the rival options both believed at
various stages that they had won the president over. For a full ten
days, the sitting prime minister Mauroy was uncertain whether or
not he was to remain at his post and, if so, which economic policy
he would be required to pursue. A similar conclusion went for
finance minister Delors, who on at least one occasion believed he
was about to be named prime minister. The overall impression
w~s one of confusion and uncertainty, undoubtedly because
Mitterrand himself was torn between his emotional commitment
to continuing the socialist experiment and the perilous state of the
French economy. Indeed, the president had to make repeated
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speeches throughout France to drive home the message that he
fully supported his finance minister and the new austerity policy.
To be able to make informed, well thought-out decisions
Mitterrand consistently seeks conflicting policy advice, plural
sources of information and rival policy advisers. This may take
the form of setting two or more advisers to work on the same
policy dossier in order to test their mettle, without, of course,
informing them of their dual labors. Far from being merely a
presidential game, this method is felt by Mitterrand to avoid
excessive hierarchy amongst advisers, to provide him with the
fullest advice possible and to remind everybody that no one can
take his approval for granted. The spirit of competition amongst
Mitterrand's policy advisers is reportedly intense.
Very few of Mitterrand's advisers, not even Jacques
Attali, the "special" adviser until April 1991, can genuinely claim
to be continually in the president's confidence, or to predict the
way that his mind is working. Mitterrand has a taste for secrecy.
His advisers have on occasion been so firmly convinced that the
president has made a finn decision that they have announced it as
such to the media, only later to be reprimanded and to fall into
temporary disgrace. Undoubtedly Mitterrand's secrecy has always been an important part of his personality, but it is reinforced
by the isolation imposed by the nature of presidential decisionmaking, an isolation characteristically felt by chief executives
elsewhere.
Mitterrand's extensive informal network goes well beyond that comprised by the mitterrandistes mentioned below.
Those who, in all walks oflife, have served Minerrand will not be
forgotten, although rarely taken into his confidence. Those who
have had the misfortune to cross him, and who remain unrepentant, for example, Pierre Mendes-France, will rarely be forgiven.
Rocard had to spend some eight years of purgatory before finally
being forgiven by Mitterrand for his presumption in challenging
him for the Socialist nomination in 1981. These ties are based as
much on personal affinity and mutual exchanges of services as
they are on political loyalties. Witness, for example, Mitterrand's
cultivation of student leaders such as Isabelle Thomas, rock stars
such as Renaud, or sporting heroes . Partly because of his checkered career, members of Mitterrand's network by no means all
belong to the left, nor are they limited to the world of politics.
THE MITTERRANDISTES

Mitterrand's biographers are unanimous in pointing to the importance of the highly complex ties binding him to his closest politica l
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associates. In fact he has attracted inte~se political l?yalty froz:n
several generations of followers, rallying progressively to his
cause throughout his long car~er. A ~rrst generation of lo)'.al
subordinates gradually crystallized dunng the Fourth Republic,
when he led the Union Democratique des Socialistes de la
Resistance. These included Georges Dayan, a friend since student
days who died in 1979, Roland Dumas, foreign secretary since
1983 Georges Beauchamps, who quit politics for business, and
Loui; Mermaz, head of the Socialist parliamentary group for most
of the Mitterand decade. The next generation of mitterrandistes,
unsurprisingly, were younger._ Their loyalty t~ Mitterrand was
forged in the early 1950s. This second group included Charles
Hernu, whose Club des J acobins was one of the few genuine clubs
in the early Convention des Institutions Republicaines (CIR),
Pierre Joxe and Claude Estier. These historic mitterrandistes
were suspicious not only of each other, but also of the sabras, the
new generation of Mitterrand's proteges who made their careers
within the Socialist Party after 1971. The sabras were so named
after the first generation of native Israelis; they had come to the
Socialist Party as their first conventional political engagement
and had demonstrated an absolute loyalty to Mitterrand. The most
prominent sabras still largely dominate the Socialist Party; these
include Fabius, prime minister 1984-6 and president of the National Assembly since June 1988; Lionel Jospin, party leader
1981-6 and now education minister; and Attali, Mitterrand's
personal adviser from the mid-1970s until April 1991, a man
credited with an inside knowledge of the president that few can
match.
Mitterrand demanded absolute loyalty from his political
aides, and usually obtained it. In fact, rivalries between mitterrandistes were frequently intense, as each competed for the leader's
favor. Indeed the leader saw such competition as healthy, because
it prevented any one politician from emerging as the successor and
thereby potentially threatening his continued suzerainty. When
one of Mitterrand's presumed heirs assumed that he was strong
enough to contradict the leader, he was firmly cut down to size, as
Fabius discovered to his cost in 1985-6. The mitterrandistes were
conscious of belonging to a privileged family, les intimes du
Prince. Despite their fratricidal rivalries, especially between the
<;IR clan and the sabras, the different generations of Mitterrand's
lieutenants usually subjected themselves to his will. From around
1974 onwards, with his control of the Socialist Party virtually
complete, the leader-follower ties developed between Mitterran~ and his lieutenants promoted patron-client relationships,
which intensified once he had won the presidency. Politicians
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who depended on Mitterrand for their political careers usually
rewarded their sponsor with absolute loyalty. Apart from reflecting his personal qualities, Mitterrand's political style probably
developed from his original status as an outsider, a parliamentary
broker well versed in the art of political flexibility, distrustful of
institutional rigidities.
Thus personalized ties were privileged as a mechanism for
governing, first the party, and late the nation. For this reason,
official governing structures probably bore scant relationship to
the manner in which power was actually exercised. Mitterrandism became synonymous with a de-institutionalization of decision-making. This could be illustrated with regard to both the
Socialist Party before 1981 and the actual rather than formal
structure of authority in Mitterrand's governments after 1981.
Mitterrand governed the Socialist Party after 1974 in a largely
presidential manner, creating a "dual circuitoflegitimacy" within.
the party leadership by appointing his own personal delegates to
parallel the work of the official national secretariat, the party's
main executive organ. 14 These delegates were responsible to
Mitterrand alone, and they enabled him to keep himself informed
of all the party's main policy areas and activities without having
to rely on the official organization. After Mitterrand was elected
president, his political advisers in the Ely see staff (le Secretariat
General de l' Elysee) performed a similar function, this time in
relation to government departments. UnderMauroy (1981-4) and
still more under Fabius (1984-6), the governmental system was
largely dominated by mitterrandistes, although Mauroy could not
really be described as such. This greatly reduced the potential for
conflict between the different institutions of the Socialist power
structure-party leadership, parliamentary group, and executive.
Each was controlled by the president's supponers, or, in the case
of Mauroy until 1984, firmly subordinated to the president.
Mitterrand's preference for evolving new types of personalized, unofficial arrangements for guiding the government and
the Socialist Pany in the right direction was displayed in numerous ways. In a typically French manner the dining-table performed a quasi-official function as the arena where great affairs of
state were discussed in a semi-formal fashion. At the early stages
of his presidency, especially during the "state of grace" (1981-2),
he spent a minimum of two breakfasts and one dinner a week
meeting with representatives of the party leadership , the prime
minister and selected ministers. The great novelty of these
occasions was the petit dejeuner du courant A on Tuesday
mornings, when the president met with the leaders of his faction
within the Socialist Party, led by Jospin, in the absence of the
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prime minister Mauroy. Such meetings between the president and
his party leaders to discuss _policy . ~ere unprecedented in the
history of the Fifth Republic. Critics argued that they were
symbolic of the chaos wroug?twithin t~eexecut~ve by ~~terrand's
governina style. Maurey s authonty as pnme mm1ster was
frequently undermined by individ~al minist~rs app_e~lingdirectly
to the president to back them agarn~t. the pnme m_rn1ster.
.
If Mitterrand has made political loyalty rnto a cardinal
virtue, this has been transformed only rarely into personal friendship. Those to whom he permits himself to use the familiar tu form
of address are limited to his immediate family, and a handful of
exceptionally close friends. Despite the rivalries prevailing
amongst Mitterrand's differe_nt l~eu_tenants, the sense of all belonging to an extended family 1s rmportant. Every year, the
extended mitterrandiste family joins together on a number of
symbolic occasions, such as the Elysee garden party on July 14,
or the trek to Solutre in Burgundy just before ' the September
rentree des classes. Media attention focuses closely upon who is
invited to such gatherings, and even more so on those out of favor.
Mitterrand's political career has been characterized above
all by a rare capacity to adapt to changing political circumstances.
He was one of the first politicians to respond with shrewd
acceptance of the new "rules of the game" implied by the presidential election, despite his initial condemnation of the new
regime as a coup d'etat permanent. His status as presidential
leader of the left for most of the period after the first direct election
of the president in 1965 was of immense political benefit to him,
eventually carrying him to the presidency in 1981. There was
nothing predestined about this.
Mitterrand was initially an unlikely champion of the left.
He displayed considerable political skill in his dealings with other
politicians, opponents and allies alike, as well as in his perception
of the requirements of political strategy. Of course, he had his
share of chance and misfortune, like any other successful politician. Along with his flexibility, his personal resilience, and his
ability to recover from seemingly hopeless political situations, as
in 1958, 1968 or 1986, should be noted.
While there can be little doubt concerning the importance
of the presidential institutions of the Fifth Republic for Mitterrand's
caree~, it _isprobably impossible as yet to measure how great his
contnbut1on to the contemporary political environment in France
has ~een. ~ny assessment involves a large measure of subjective
cons1derat1on. Had Mitterrand not won the presidency in 1981,
the left would have been deprived of the possibility of attempting
to translate its radical dreams, nurtured by long years of opposi101

tion, into reality. Without the left' s early radical program and the
difficulties it encountered, it is unclear whether the degree of
economic consensus which currently exists in France would ever
have materialized. In so far as his first seven-year term as
president symbolized the transformation of old-style socialism,
Mitterrand must take the credit or blame, symbolically at least, for
reconciling the left with the economy, and the Socialist Party with
its social-democratic fate. This is so, although he was clearly
reacting to events, rather than foreseeing them clearly. On the
positive side, Mitterrand is a living testimony to the fact that the
reformist left in France no longer feels a sense of exclusion from
the political system of the Fifth Republic. By extension he has
helped to secure a wider, bi-partisan acceptance of the political
regime. Of course, none of these factors should be ascribed to
Mitterrand alone. The economic and political aggiornamento of
his first term was forced upon him by complex forces outside of
his control. At best, he reacted with considerable flexibility to
events he only partially commanded. But some would argue that
the effectiveness of political leadership depends as much on a
leader's adaptability as it does on any refusal in principle to
change course. Our final impression of Mitterrand must be that of
a formidable politician able to command unrivalled loyalty, the
most formidable certainly since de Gaulle, but also that of a man
who remains an enigma. In the words of July again, "even for his
closest friends, the man is elusive." 15
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